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South African exports of steam coal are the second-largest in the world and 
her collieries are the third-largest global exporters of coal per se. As such, 
the coal mining industry accounts for 34% percent of the total output of 
South Africa’s mining sector. (Survey of Trade and Industry, 1996). The 
industry is making a valuable direct and valuable contribution to the 
development of the South African economy, because it provides thousands 
of jobs and has many backward and forward linkages. The effects of 
HIV/AIDS in this labour-intensive minerals sector are therefore likely to be 
devastating. 
Sub-Saharan Africa has only 10% of the world’s population, yet 
83% of world-wide AIDS deaths reported last year were from this region. 
AIDS is expected to cost 10 million South Africans their lives by 2015 
(Mining Weekly, 14/12/2001). The gazette also quotes Southern Africa’s 
estimate in Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD)  -that 
27% of mineworkers will have died of AIDS by 2005.  Gold Fields 
calculates that in its workforce, 26,4% of employees between the ages of 24 
and 54 are infected. Platinum producer Lonmin reported a 26% infection 
rate, while Anglo Platinum test results showed an infection level of 18%-
22% (Mining Weekly, 14/12/2001). It is unclear how the mining houses 
derived these figures, as testing may be done only with informed consent, 
and mining unions have advised their members against it. These estimates 
have led to an admission by the Department of Minerals and Energy that 
‘there is no clear indication of what the mineworker infection rate is at 
present…the infection rate cannot be determined on an empirical basis’ 
(Mining Weekly, 14/12/2001). Given that the average national infection rate 
for adults at that time stood at 24,5%, these estimates do not seem unlikely. 
(Statistic quoted by Chamber of Mines health advisor Lettie la Grange in 
Mining Weekly, 14/12/2001). 
 This paper will give an overview of scenarios used so far, both in 




AIDS pandemic. A case study will be done at a South African colliery (‘the 
firm’),  which is one of many collieries that are a subsidiary of a major coal 
provider (‘the holding company’). Various costs, that one would expect to 
indicate the effects of HIV/AIDS mortality and morbidity in the firm, will 
be examined. This analysis will be supplemented with anecdotal evidence 
from the firm studied. Responses of the firm to the threat of AIDS will then 
be discussed and directions for future research suggested. 
 
 
Overview Of Cost Scenarios Used To Study 
The Impact Of AIDS On Firms 
  
The economic impact of HIV/AIDS can be studied at three levels: the 
macroeconomic, household and the sector/industry level. The body of case 
study research on the economic impact of HIV/AIDS on firms is small (e.g. 
Baggeley, 1994; Forsythe, 1994; Lowenson, 1996 and 1997; Naidu, 2001; 
J.P. Morgan, 2001; Heard, 2001; Evian, 2000), but is slowly and steadily 
growing. Unfortunately, most studies ‘rely heavily on estimated HIV 
epidemiology and costing or incomplete data’ (Morris et al, 2000:942 ). 
Typically, this is done by imputing a level of HIV infection and associated 
deaths onto a firm via a demographic model (e.g. the Doyle Model, ASSA 
2000). This was the approach taken by economists and consultants who 
provided briefing documents to the Chamber of Mines (Sadie, 1991; Evian, 
2000.) Alternatively, since the level of HIV infection is not usually known 
and as it is not clear which deaths are AIDS-related or not, researchers have 
to rely on incomplete statistics of known or suspected AIDS cases, provided 
by medical personnel at the firm level. 
The few studies conducted concentrate on prevalence of the disease 
and factors that increase the risk of infection. These studies are not done 
from an economic point of view, neither do they estimate the quantitative 
impact of HIV at the workplace (Mbizvo, 1996; Bassett, 1996; Gwanzura, 
1998; Bassett, 1992; and Campbell, 2001). Besides those of  Lowenson 
(1997) and Aventin and Huard (2000), quantitative assessments of the 
impact on costs at a firm level are uncommon.  Morris et al (2000:942) 
believe that this data is important ‘in determining the cost effectiveness of 
interventions aimed at this population, more accurately determining the 
impact of HIV on individual industries and in the planning and policy 
arenas.’  
Most studies that tried to assess the economic impact of the 




included the cost of funerals, the value of production and remuneration 
sacrificed due to increased sick leave, the training and recruitment costs 
associated with replacing deceased or medically retired workers, as well as 
the additional costs associated with increased pressure on health care 
resources (such as medical aid or clinic services at plant level) and so on. 
While these studies highlight trends in quantifiable costs, they are 
hampered in four ways. Firstly, to a very large extent, they are hindered by 
the fact that they are driven by assumptions. It is difficult to determine how 
many HIV-positive people there are and almost equally importantly, what 
their CD4 counts are. This is problematic in South Africa, because labour 
law requires an employee’s informed consent before testing is done and 
only the Labour Court can compel employees to be tested.  
Secondly, there is the problem of the counter-factual, or the 
impossibility of knowing how the firm would have progressed in the 
absence of HIV/AIDS. Estimates are based on the ceteris paribus 
assumption that there are no changes except the impact of AIDS. This 
assumption does not hold in the calculation of impact assessments, as firms 
react to the epidemic by altering their strategies. One would have to 
untangle what changes made at the firm level are a function of (or 
exacerbated by) concerns about reducing the impact of AIDS on the firm 
and which are a function of exogenous factors, such as technological 
change. It is, however, almost impossible to disentangle the impact of AIDS 
from other external forces affecting the firm. 
Thirdly, the ‘unquantifiable’ factors (such as productivity losses, 
the impact on morale, the effect of fatigue on individuals and the 
functioning of teams) are not dealt with effectively. To cope with this 
problem, Aventin and Huard (2000) adopted a ‘two-stage methodology’ to 
look at the impact of AIDS on costs. They divide costs into ‘direct’ and 
‘indirect’ costs. Each of these two classes are then further divided into 
‘quantifiable’ and ‘difficult to quantify’ direct/indirect costs. The second 
stage of their analysis is to supplement the quantitative assessment with 
qualitative data, to give the reader a ‘feel’ for the situation at the firm level 
and to highlight the response of the firm for future use in impact 
assessments.  
This paper pays particular attention to the second-stage approach 
used by Aventin and Huard (2000). In this study the quantitative assessment 
of a consultant (Evian, 2000) and internal data of researchers in the firm will 
be examined. The aim is to go beyond Aventin and Huard by taking a more 






A Critical Overview of Existing Impact 
Assessments in the Mining Industry 
 
Sadie et al (1991) have assessed the costs of AIDS to the mining industry, 
using the Doyle model and data from the Chamber of Mines. A division was 
made between direct costs and opportunity costs, the former comprising 
prevention, treatment, compensation, research and replacement costs. 
Treatment costs include medical care in the asymptomatic phase (before the 
worker has progressed to full-blown AIDS), as well as symptomatic 
treatment, but no antiretroviral drugs are included in their calculations. 
Under opportunity costs they have allocated an amount of R7000 per AIDS 
sufferer who is unable to contribute to production, although no methodology 
for estimating this cost is given in the document. They arrive at an estimated 
cost to the entire industry of R1509 million in the year 2010 (base year 
1992). 
A weakness of the paper as a whole is that no calculations are 
given for the costs mentioned. This is vital, especially in the case of 
opportunity costs - which can be very subjective – and leads the reader to 
view their results with a certain amount of scepticism.  
 
 
Critical Discussion of Impact Assessments Done 
on the Firm Studied 
Dr. Clive Evian conducted an impact assessment for the holding company 
and its subsidiaries in April 2000 and then again in April 2001. The firm 
studied is one member of the mining subsidiary. He based his estimations of 
accumulative HIV prevalence and incidence on several assumptions that do 
not hold for the firm studied - for example, that there is a period of seven 
years from the time of infection to the onset of AIDS and a further twelve 
months to the stage of full-blown AIDS. According to the AIDS director 
interviewed, the average time amongst coal mining firms is six-and- a-half 
to seven years (from infection to death.) 
He also assumed that the firm’s workforce would not be altered 
between 2000 and 2004. Employment is in fact decreasing due to project 
changes and improvement of work processes. Therefore,  as the firm 
becomes more efficient, it means that the underground portion of the 
workforce is growing smaller, as the labourers who leave are not being 
replaced. 
 When the reported incidence of AIDS was found to be lower than 




and incidence curves forward by eight years for the second prediction - for 
example, it was predicted that there would be 255 new AIDS cases in 2001, 
and this is now only expected to occur in 2009. This could be because he did 
not take the changing workforce numbers into account when making his 
second prediction. Alternatively, his predictions may have been correct, but 
the full complement of AIDS cases may not have been reported to 
management. Management may therefore have been led to the conclusion 
that the disease is not as prevalent as Dr. Evian estimated, as fewer cases 
were brought to their attention. 
A cost scenario was then drawn up by the AIDS Director of the 
subsidiaries (refer to Table 1). It assumes that a minimum of 15% of the 
workforce will be lost due to AIDS, as per Dr. Evian’s estimation of a 15-
20% infection rate in the work force. Kramer (2001), basing his estimates on 
saliva tests, also cites this rate as being the prevailing one amongst his 
clients.  The AIDS Director has considered both quantifiable and 
unquantifiable direct costs, as well as indirect quantifiable costs. No attempt 
was made to bring indirect costs that are difficult to quantify, such as ‘work 
disorganisation, breakdown of social bonds, decrease of work rates, or 
know-how transmission disrupting,’ (Aventin and Huard, 2000:171) into the 
cost scenario. In addition,  the above costs did not take cognisance of 
‘down-time’ due to fatigue, or any reimbursements for accidents due to 
fatigued or ill workers operating heavy machinery underground.  
Absenteeism is by far the highest cost, accounting for R5036395 
(43%) of total expected costs per annum. Replacement costs for 15% of the 
workforce are also sizeable, at 25% of annual costs. Funeral expenses due to 
AIDS are also significant, at 11% of the predicted costs. Human resources 
costs are by far the largest, and additional personnel that need to be hired 
will make up 7% of expected total AIDS-related costs. This percentage rises 
to 13% if the real increases in hired labour and contractor’s costs are also 
considered. It must be considered that these figures are a conservative 
estimate of expected AIDS fatalities in the firm. 
The cost of AIDS as a percentage of the total payroll was estimated 
by the firm, and is shown the table below. The estimated number of deaths 
due to AIDS (third column) against total number of employees (second 
column) is shown. A cost per AIDS victim is allocated to compute the 
fourth column of AIDS incurred costs. Finally, costs due to AIDS are shown 








Table 1: Total Estimated Costs of AIDS to the Coal 
Mining Division of the Firm. * 
 
 









PERCENTAGE     
OF TOTAL  
PAYROLL 
2000 8731 110 8,618,683 1.23 
2001 8731 157 11,638,498 1.58 
2002 8366 203 14,891,472 1.98 
2003 8322 243 17,954,832 2.29 
2004 8065 244 18,805,231 2.34 
2005 7784 216 17,783,824 2.18 
2006 7561 191 16,900,940 2.04 
2007 7451 148 14,385,504 1.67 
2008 7234 132 13,921,930 1.58 
2009 7066 123 13,641,387 1.51 
2010 6886 117 13,899,308 1.49 
TOTAL 11 YEARS  162,441,609  
 
* Based on data taken from Evian (2000. 
 
 
Sizeable as the AIDS-incurred costs at first appear to be, they are in 
fact a surprisingly small percentage of the total payroll. Aventin and Huard 
(2000) found that with an HIV prevalence of 15%, between 10.3% and 15% 
of the wage bill would be spent on caring for the HIV+/AIDS employees in 
manufacturing firms in Cote d’Ivoire. This leads one to believe that costing 
based on a 15% HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is far too conservative, or 
alternatively, that the firm has not considered vital costs. In fact the AIDS 
director and the mine doctor admitted that it is now believed that prevalence 
is at the 22% level, but it was not mentioned how this figure was derived. 




increased group life insurance premiums, or pension/provident fund 
increases. Most significantly, no loss of productivity or reorganisation was 
estimated, as in the Aventin and Huard study. Neither was a proportion of 
the wage bill for medical personnel (based on time spent on estimated 
HIV/AIDS sufferers) included in the cost scenario. Dismissals and 
severance pay have also not been accounted for. No overtime costs were 
taken into account, but then neither were they accounted for by Aventin and 
Huard, 2000. 
These costs could increase the impact of the disease significantly 
for the firm. Aventin and Huard (2000), Morris et al (2000), Rosen et al 
(2000) and Naidu (2001) all mention qualitative but ‘difficult to quantify’ 
costs as a major component of impact assessments. Unfortunately, these 
costs are highly subjective and many assumptions have to be made when 
calculating them. This makes it a seemingly impossible task for 
management. The accuracy of these assumptions is also impaired by costing 
done by upper management or consultants, who are not always ‘in touch’ 
with work processes and employees ‘at the coal face’. This may negatively 
influence perceptions of the impact of the disease on the firm and may 
explain the fact that existing studies have not taken this type of cost into 
account.   
 
 
Tracing the Impact of AIDS: Investigation of 
Costs at the Firm Studied 
 
Unlike Aventin and Huard, specific cases of HIV/AIDS in the firm could 
not be identified for the purposes of this case study. The result of this was 
that the costs associated with only these cases could not be examined. This 
paper will nevertheless try to examine the costs engendered by HIV/AIDS 
by studying the various cost categories that Aventin and Huard examined – 
i.e. those where one would expect the impact of the pandemic to be felt. 
These are: sick leave, compassionate leave and days absent without 
permission (AWOP’s); health costs borne by the firm (including HIV/AIDS 
tests); funeral expenses and funeral attendance costs borne by the firm; 
prevention; invalidity pensions; recruitment and training; 








1.  Sick Leave, Compassionate Leave and Days 
Absent Without Permission (AWOPs)  
Leave and AWOP paper records were converted into electronic format in 
March this year and stored on computer tape. Thus, quick retrieval of these 
records was not possible and the information they contain will not be used 
to analyse the effects of AIDS on the firm. In any case, the mine doctor at 
the firm studied believes that this data would not be helpful to me as an 
indicator, as he does not think that the effects of AIDS will show up in the 
records. An additional factor is that any worker who is absent without leave 
for five consecutive days can be dismissed immediately.  These employees 
will be out of the system at once and no trace of any increase in their 
sickness (which may indicate HIV/AIDS) will remain in the mine records.  
 
 
2.  Health Costs Borne by the Firm (Including the 
Cost of HIV/AIDS Tests) 
Health costs borne by the firm are particularly hard to estimate. 
Tuberculosis medication is supplied free of charge by the government, but 
no records of medication of sexually transmitted diseases, or vitamins 
supplied by the firm, have been kept by the mine hospital. The mine doctor 
believes that there is an approximate total, for all the mines, of 70 new cases 
of sexually transmitted diseases per week.  
There are no records kept of the number or results of HIV/AIDS tests. 
According to the law, staff are not allowed to note an HIV test or its result 
on a patient’s hospital record. Also by law, no records are allowed to be kept 
indicating whether a person is HIV positive or not. However, a nurse at the 
hospital confided to me that she and fellow nurses write ‘PTC’ or ‘pre-test 
counselling’ on the patient’s record to inform each other of the status of 
patients.  They were not prepared to share this information with me.  
It does not seem likely that the mine will provide antiretroviral drugs to 
employees in the near future. This is due to the time-consuming cost of 
monitoring patients, the lack of infrastructure (such as laboratories to 
conduct the tests) and the strict regimen of medication that patients must 
follow (5% non-compliance with the dosage instructions leads to a 50% 
increase in resistance), which the mine doctor believes will be too 
impractical to implement. The only antiretroviral drugs kept on the premises 
are for use in cases where medical staff accidentally prick themselves with a 
needle which might be infected by the HIV virus. The AIDS director was 
also committed to making hospital antiretroviral drugs available to any rape 




A fully-equipped hospital is kept at the colliery and treatment is free for 
all employees and their spouses. Expenses are paid for by the mine, with the 
exception of tuberculosis medication, supplied by the government. Two full-
time doctors staff the hospital and they have several nurses assisting them.  
Walking through the hospital wards, there were plenty of unoccupied 
beds and the nursing staff were able to attend adequately to the patients. A 
nurse at the hospital who administers the AIDS tests reports that the 
majority of patients only come for tests when they are very ill and in the 
final stages of the disease. They have the tests done to confirm their worst 
suspicions that they may have AIDS. She says that the standard response of 
most patients, despite pre-test counselling, is to believe that they will pass 
away within the next few days. ‘Most of them cannot handle the news, they 
just get up and run away. They say they are going to go and pack their bags, 
that they might as well go home now, as they are going to die soon. A very 
few (one or two) might come back to me for counselling and help, once they 
have had time to deal with the news and get over the shock, but in most 
cases, I will not see them again,’ she concludes.  
This may be for two reasons: It could reflect the severe stigma that 
surrounds AIDS on the mines, which Sadie (1991:5) calls ‘an aura of death 
and defilement’. The hospital nurse cited the example of a hostel-dweller 
who was severely beaten by his peers and had to be hospitalised when his 
associates suspected that he had AIDS. She herself has been the target of 
verbal abuse from mine employees for her role in administering the AIDS 
tests. Secondly, she believes that most staff, who cannot afford a private 
practitioner, will go to the clinic in the township nearby. The workers seem 
to believe that their sero-status will not be kept confidential because the 
hospital sustains the hospital financially (and also fear that they might lose 
their jobs). 
The above factors indicate therefore that the hospital expenses and the 
HIV tests performed reflect a gross under-estimation of the number of cases 
in the firm. These HIV/AIDS cases may nevertheless be affecting the cost 
structure of the company in other ways, yet their impact is unappreciated 
and therefore unaccounted for by management, since the full complement is 
not translating into increased health costs for the firm.  
 
 
3.  Funeral Costs, Pension and Provident Fund 
Increases 
According to administrative staff interviewed,  no changes were apparently 




mine, nor to the length of employee contracts. 
Between R2,50 and R10,00 per month is deducted from each employee 
of the firm and this amount is contributed towards a fund.  Out of this fund, 
a cheque of R8500 is given to the family of a deceased employee to cover 
funeral expenses.  Three years’ salary is also paid out to the family, plus an 
additional R200000-R300000 if the employee was a member of the 
provident fund. The company will send representatives to visit the family to 
give them the cheque on the company’s behalf and to attend the funeral of 
the employee. In 2001 a budget of R203790 was set aside to cover these 
costs, and the company contribution to the insurance fund is estimated to be 
R243 894. Thus, funeral expenses are estimated to cost the company a total 
of R447 685 per year. 
  
 
4.  Prevention 
The firm has employed a full-time AIDS Director to manage the firm’s 
HIV/AIDS program. He conducts AIDS education seminars for the 
company, liaises with the representatives of other companies to co-ordinate 
their response to AIDS in the surrounding community, and negotiates the 
company’s HIV/AIDS retrenching agreement with the unions. He has a 
budget of R2.1 million, which includes the supply of condoms. 
 
 
5.  Invalidity Pensions and Lost Productivity/ 
Reorganisation  
No employees are given invalidity pensions as such. Any employee who 
becomes too ill to work may take voluntary retirement. Most of the 
employees in the wage earner category cannot afford to do this and once 
they are unable to perform work underground, they take jobs as gardeners, 
or do maintenance work above ground.  Approximately 20 men from all the 
mines owned by the firm were working in this category at the time of the 
study. These employees are paid the same salary as they were receiving for 
their job underground, until they choose to leave the firm. The difference 
between the wage they were paid underground and the wage payable for the 
surface job they now do represents the cost of AIDS to the firm. 
 
 
6.  Dismissals/ Severance Pay 
The services of AIDS victims will eventually be terminated by the firm as a 




therefore increase. Four consultations must take place: with the employee, 
the employee’s representative, the personnel officers from the Employee 
Services Department, and the Personnel Officer from the particular mine 
concerned. The aim is to seek alternative employment positions within the 
company before the services of the employee have to be terminated on the 
grounds of incapacity.  The employee will receive a remuneration package 
from the firm if he is not a member of a pension or provident fund. This 
package consists of: 
•  Three weeks’ basic salary for each completed year of service, as well 
as a pro-rata payment for an incomplete year of service. 
•  Four months’ basic salary and a housing subsidy for four months (if 
applicable). 
•  Four times 32% of the basic salary the employee was earning. 
•  Hostel accommodation for one month after termination of services, if 
applicable. 
•  Furniture and removal costs, medical loans up to a maximum of R1000 
and study loans will be written off.  
The above information taken from an agreement in this regard between the 
firm and the union on the mine. 
 
 
7.  Recruitment, Training and Selection Costs 
Recruitment and training costs should be decreasing if no more labour is 
being hired in the wage-earner category. Recruitment and selection are 
estimated by the company to cost R6501 per wage earner (WP), R20302 per 
mine salaried employee (MSP) and R25928 per salaried employee (SP). In 
2001, Evian (2000) estimates that 128 wage earners, 13 monthly salaried 
personnel and 16 salaried personnel are affected by the disease. This brings 
the total annual cost to approximately R1,5 million. Training costs for new 
employees who replace the deceased mentioned above are R3612 (WP) 
R13535 (MSP) and R19206 per salaried person (SP). This is a total of 
approximately R1 million on selection alone and costs the firm R2,5 million 
per annum for recruitment, selection and training. 
 
 
8.  Overtime 
Not all overtime incurred by the company is AIDS-related. A member of 
management reported that often middle management working underground 
would commission overtime in order to reach their production targets and 




blasting out geological formations that are in the way of the coal can be 




Problems Incurred in Estimating the Above 
Costs in the Firm Studied 
 
The investigation into the costs of the disease to the firm being studied was 
hampered by lack of information and records which it kept. Information on 
sick leave, especially in the ‘Absent Without Leave’ and ‘Compassionate  
Leave’ categories would have been of interest, as one would expect them to 
show increases as HIV+ employees fell ill more frequently. A breakdown of 
hospital expenditure would also have been useful, as tuberculosis and 
sexually transmitted diseases (STD’s) occur with increased incidence as the 
immune system is weakened by AIDS (Campbell, 1998 and 2001).  This 
could be used as a rough measure of the increasing prevalence of the disease 
in the firm. More insight into employee turnover would be useful, 
particularly if one knew why employees were leaving the firm (e.g. whether 
due to illness and work incapacity or the employee being fired for not being 
at work for five days without leave – possibly also as a result of illness).  
The firm has only recently provided data on the different causes of turnover. 
The retrieval of pre-1998 data would be very costly and time-consuming to 
management and therefore they did not consider this a viable exercise.  Data 
on overtime and the wage bill, for wage personnel in particular, would also 
have been useful. 
 
 
Tracing the Impact of AIDS: Beyond the 
Aventin and Huard Methodology 
 
It was decided in this case study to look at the firm in greater depth in an 
attempt to  estimate the impact of AIDS over time.  This meant going 
beyond the methodology of Aventin and Huard (2000), who examined the 
detrimental effects of HIV/AIDS on a number of infected employees for 







1.  Coal Output 
Bearing in mind that the firm under study is a colliery, one might expect a 
decrease in coal output with the increased incidence in AIDS in the 
underground workforce, because workers will be weakened and  production 
lowered. This should be particularly noticeable given that the majority of 
employees working underground are wage personnel, whom Evian (2000) 
expects to have the highest incidence of AIDS.  
Figures 1 and 2 show the number of tons of coal produced since the 
inception of the mine, as well as the number of tons produced per machine. 
Production was low in the first year when the mine started operations (June 
1981) and only six months’ production are reflected. There was a steep 
increase in production from 1986 to 1993, as well as in 1997/98 and 1999 
/2000. Since 2000 though, a decrease in production can be observed. It 
would be too hasty to attribute this to the effects of the disease alone, 
because two production teams were not producing coal for six months each 
during the 2000/2001 financial year.  
 
 
Figure 1: Tons of Coal Produced 1981-2001 
 

















However, it is clear from statements of  geologists interviewed and the 
production reports of the mine that the factors affecting coal output are very 




the past twenty years would not give a clear indication of the effects of 
HIV/AIDS on the firm. Firstly, the mine’s geologists point out that the mine 
is nearing the end of its ‘lifespan’. The areas with the thickest coal seams 
and most easily accessible coal have already been mined out. Although the 
mine is still profitable, the production teams are increasingly mining further 
away from the main shafts and have to travel for a longer period of time 
before they can begin working. 
In addition, the geologists explained that coal seams are now 
thinner and floors softer, so  contamination1 is likely to increase.  ‘Down 
time’2 will increase whenever production teams do maintenance work on 
machines or move to mine in different areas; also when dykes and other 
geological features are blasted through in order to reach the coal. The 
interference of geological features is a purely random occurrence that 
interferes with production data. There is a myriad of other factors that 
decrease mining time, such as crew station talks, training and machine 
breakdowns. These factors all interfere with production and make it difficult 
to isolate the effects of AIDS-related fatigue and absenteeism. 
Further decrease in overall production is dictated by the refinery to 
which the mine supplies coal.  There have been work process improvements 
implemented at the refinery, which have led to a demand there for less coal. 
The demand for coal in the market place is also falling; it is met from 
stockpiles of coal on the mine, which are at a maximum. As a result, less is 
needed to ‘top up’ the stockpiles after the market demand has been met.  
Technology in the mining industry in South Africa has also 
changed over the past twenty years. John Lang (1995:207) believes that ‘the 
technology of cutting coal developed in Europe and the United States was 
applied with little adaptation. Collieries were able to step up productivity 
through mechanisation at a far faster rate than gold mines…There was a 
consequential swing to the employment of more skilled labour at the 
expense of the less skilled...Higher productivity flowed largely from 
improved technology.’ At the firm of interest, technological advancement is 
reflected in its new machinery. Both single and double continuous miners3 
have been used to a greater or lesser degree. The mine has experimented 
with five different types of continuous miners since the 1994/1995 financial 
                                                 
1 ‘Contamination’ occurs when any other rock besides coal is mined. 
  
2 Time when the continuous miner is not mining out coal due to repair, cleaning, 
maintenance etc. 
 





year alone. As a consequence then, one would naturally then expect 
production to fluctuate. 
Taking the changes in production technology into account, a graph 
showing tons of coal produced per machine was drawn up for the purposes 
of this paper. Several different types of machine have been used over the 
lifespan of the mine, but data was available only from 1994 onwards. Since 
the ‘single sections’ with one machine mine out roughly half the amount of 
coal that the ‘double sections’ with two machines will produce, the former 
has been counted as one machine and the latter as two. Total production for 
each year was divided by the number of machines across all single and 
double sections to get a rough figure for production per machine, per year.  
This gives one a very different impression of production (Figure 2). 
It appears that production per machine is increasing much more noticeably 
than in the past.  This suggests that if AIDS is undermining productivity, the 
effect is being masked by technological improvements. In fact, it shows the 
benefits to the firm of employing more capital-intensive work processes. In 
support of this, one interviewee at the firm confirmed that they were then 
operating with twelve machines, with only a slight decrease in output 
compared with previous years, when they had twenty machines. 
In an interview with a mine overseer he mentioned that certain 
production teams are more productive due to a change in their leadership. A 
good leader will inspire loyalty in a team (known as a ‘section’) and bring 
out the best  in the men in the area of the mine for which he is responsible 
(also called a ‘section’). Some men have been in the same section for ten to 
fifteen years and therefore work well together. Certain of the sections have 
been closed down (and the production team re-deployed to other areas of the 
mine) as it no longer became profitable to mine in those areas. Other 
sections have been opened up as the mine expanded, so the number of 
sections producing coal has varied over the years. Also influencing coal 
output levels is the on-going improvement process that the entire firm and 
its holding company has been undergoing for the past two years. According 
to the Mine Technical Manager, Mine Overseer and Geologists interviewed, 
the production teams were sent for training, processes were changed and 
improved, and more checks and balances put in place. 
Production targets were set for each section, based on its maximum 
potential production, taking into account all factors that might affect this in 
1997 (a very productive year). If teams managed to close 50% of the gap 
between their present production and 1997 levels, they were rewarded with 
payments of as much as five times their salaries. It was relatively easy for 
some teams to close this gap while still not producing at the same high 
levels compared with other teams, because their production had been so low 




Figure 2: Tons of Coal Produced per Machine (1993-
2001) 




















This resulted in low morale and poor production levels in teams who were 
already producing at maximum capacity, who felt that their targets were set 
too high and then became discouraged. On the whole though, production 
levels at the colliery did increase, but this was not uniform across all 
production teams.  
Separating the effects of technology, geological conditions, 
demand for coal, morale and changing work processes from fatigue and 
sickness due to AIDS was almost impossible. Simply looking at tons of coal 
produced will not therefore give an indication of the effect of HIV/AIDS on 




2.  Capital/Labour Ratio (1984-1996) 
If one of the effects of the AIDS pandemic is that more labour is required to 
perform the same jobs, management might prefer to invest in mechanisation 
rather than hire extra labour. To see if this was occurring in the firm, the 




below). Data is taken from the records of Statistics South Africa, using their 
‘Census of Mining’ results. The census is conducted every three years and 
this may affect the inferences that can be drawn from the data. Only data up 
to 1996 is currently available, as 1999 data is still being analysed and has 
not been released yet. For the purposes of this study it is assumed that 
before 1984, the epidemic would not have made enough of an impact on 
productivity for management to consider investing more heavily in 
machinery instead of employing more labour.  
 
Table 2: Capital/Labour Ratio 1984-1996 
 
Capital: Labour Ratios (1984-1996) 
((Data taken from the 'Census of Mining Report' produced by Statistics South Africa) 
Year Opening Value (Fixed 
Assets) 
Employment Capital/Labour Ratio 




K/L Coal K/L Gold 
31/12/84 2851009 10000472 89696 499872 20.00607 20.006066 
31/12/85       
31/12/86       
31/12/87 4563135 15960439 93759 531635 48.66877 30.021423 
31/12/88       
31/12/89       
31/12/90 6117248 19732364 76321 477142 80.15157 41.355328 
31/12/91       
31/12/92       
31/12/94       
31/12/95       
31/12/96 8266368 38650575 62956 345797 131.3039 111.77244 
 
From Table 2 it can be seen that the capital/labour ratio of coal is 
higher than that of gold over the entire time period. This was an expected 
result as the coal mining process is more mechanised, whereas gold mining 
is relatively more labour-intensive. Both ratios have risen at a faster rate 
since 1988 (coal more so than that of gold), but it appears from 1996 data 
that the coal capital/labour ratio is falling. This may be due to the fact that 




while employment in the coal-mining sector rose from 61718 to 62956. It is 
also not known whether employment figures are declining due to  
mechanisation, the effects of the AIDS virus or to mines closing because of 
the declining profitability of coal. Unfortunately, since there is no recent 
data, it is unclear if this trend has continued or if the situation was 
temporary and machinery is now replacing labour in the coal mining 
industry. At the firm studied, no more labour is being hired for underground 
work (see later discussion under ‘Turnover Amongst Wage Personnel’). One 
might then expect the capital/labour ratio for the firm to rise. Moreover, the 
firm will soon be expanding the mine and the existing labour will gradually 
be moved into the new area (after they have finished mining out the coal in 
their existing areas). It will be interesting to note whether they hire more 
labour or use more mechanised processes, relative to the situation now. 
 
 
3. Employment Levels Amongst Wage Personnel  
If the AIDS pandemic were having an effect on the labour situation in a 
firm, one would expect an increase in turnover and employment levels. This 
would be as a result of labourers becoming incapacitated and leaving the 
firm, while more labourers would then be required to do the jobs of any 
workers who were fatigued as a result of HIV/AIDS.  
Figure 3 below shows the number of employees of the firm from 
January 1997 until June 2001. All employees are categorised as salaried 
personnel (SP), monthly salaried personnel (MSP) or wage earners (WP). 
Salaried personnel consist of the senior levels of mine management (highly 
skilled). Skilled personnel, such as artisans, make up the majority of the 
mine wage personnel. Unskilled labourers, as well as semi-skilled and 
skilled miners,  make up the wage personnel.  
 As can be seen from the graph, employment levels of both classes of 
salaried personnel have remained relatively constant over the time span 
covered by the graph. There is a decline in employment levels after August 
1997 as retrenchment and retirement packages were offered to certain 
employees. A noticeable decrease in employment has occurred in the wage-
earner category. However, it cannot be assumed that this is attributable to 
AIDS.  Rather, as part of an improvement programme at the mine, increases 
in production are being attempted with fewer employees. Therefore, since 
the improvement process (which involves streamlining existing work 
procedures, as well as becoming more efficient and productive) has been set 
in place at the mine, no further staff have been recruited in this category, as 
a matter of policy. (This implies that no recruitment and training costs will  









Any shortage in labour is supplied from sections of the mine that have 
closed down where there are no longer adequate reserves of coal left to 
make mining in those areas viable. This would explain the decrease in 
employment seen in the graph and would mask any impact that AIDS might 
have on employment, at current infection levels. 
 
 
4.  Turnover Amongst Wage Personnel 
The company of interest  no longer hires labour in the Wage Personnel 
category, which was confirmed by all the employment agencies for the firm.  
They also confirmed that there was excess labour in the skilled categories, 
such as artisans (boilermakers, for example) and shift bosses or mine 
captains.  
I was able to attain turnover figures from the company for January 1998 
to June 2001 (the number of employees leaving at the end of the month as a 
percentage of average number of total employees employed over the past 
year).  See Figure 4. 
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Most noticeable in Figure 4 is the sharp increase in turnover in July 
1998 which continued to July 1999, when turnover almost doubled from 
5.8% to 10%. Thereafter it dropped to approximately 6%. Since July 1999, 
turnover has changed by approximately only 2%, dropping and stabilising 
from around 6% in the 1999/2000 year, to the 4.6% level from June 2000 to 
July 2001. This implies that approximately 5% of the average number of 
people that were employed in the previous year were leaving at the end of 
each month. There is no obvious increase in turnover that could be expected 
as a result of staff leaving the firm (due to AIDS illnesses) since July 1999. 
In fact, turnover has become even more stable in the wage earner category 
over the past year. 
Since the colliery studied will soon be mining in a new area, present 
reserves of coal on this mine having been depleted, management was 
questioned as to why it is no longer hiring labour in the wage-earner 
category. The interviewee replied that two sections of the present mine 




would supplement the existing teams who (are losing workers due to AIDS) 
in the new mining area. With this, as well as more efficient work processes 
and methods,  hiring additional labour should not be necessary. It was 




5.  The Impact of AIDS at the Coal Face 
To ascertain if AIDS is affecting the production process, one of the mine 
overseers was interviewed. It appears that at the moment AIDS is affecting 
the coal extraction process because of increasing levels of absenteeism and 
fatigue.  Following on from this, safety procedures and labour policies are 
also affected. 
In the board-and-pillar mining method, coal is mined out of the 
underground seam by continuous mining machines, operated by remote 
control by the continuous miner operator. At the front of these machines is a 
cylindrical ‘head’. Curved, metal, hook-like structures called ‘picks’ are 
screwed onto the head of the continuous miner machine. The head then 
rotates into the coal seam and the picks dig out the coal. Coal that is mined 
out is then scooped up by the continuous miner and taken by three shuttle-
cars to a feeder breaker that crushes the coal into smaller pieces. Conveyor 
belts then transport the coal to the surface of the mine. 
The highest-skilled and most highly-paid position on the production 
team is a Continuous Miner Operator. It takes two months of training to 
learn to perform this job, but in the overseer’s opinion it takes an average of 
one year’s experience to achieve good, top quality production (six months if 
the worker is intelligent, literate and learns quickly). Skills that make a good 
operator are character, good co-ordination and ‘a feel for the machine’. His 
opinion is that these are very uncommon characteristics.  
If one team member of the five who are working on the continuous 
miner is sick, the machine has to be stopped. The men are therefore multi-
trained and compensate for the sick member of the team by leaving a less 
important job to fill in for the sick member. This leaves a job undone and 
slows production down (though does not halt it). There are fourteen men in 
a section and at least one is sick per month, leaving thirteen men working. 
Over one 3km-long belt-conveyor area, only seven out of the usual ten men 
will be at work, cleaning 7000 top rollers. This slows production down 
more. Normally two workers per month are not at work, as they are on 
holiday or have sick leave. This used to be quite a problem, as a miner 
would store up three months’ leave and want to take it all at once. (This 




men will not be at work at any one time. The overseer estimates that he 
loses ten men per month from the area that he manages due to AIDS-related 
deaths. The effect of fatigue and missing members has become particularly 
noticeable over the past year and he is finding it increasingly difficult to 
meet production targets. If an operator is ill (especially if he is fatigued), the 
overseer will immediately take him off the miner and assign him to a belt-
sweeping position (sweeping the belt carrying the coal) until he has 
recovered. (This is very low- skilled job, which under normal circumstances 
is paid half the operator’s salary). The reason for this is that the overseer is 
very concerned that a sick, fatigued worker who cannot concentrate properly 
could make a mistake and not only damage a very expensive piece of 
mining equipment, but more important, kill or maim another miner. This is a 
real concern for him when any of his workers are fatigued. If there is an 
accident, he is responsible. There have been no accidents yet as a result of 
fatigue as far as he knows, but he is constantly worried about its possible 
occurrence. He has really noticed the effects of AIDS-related fatigue on his 
production teams and their output, especially over the past year, when it has 
become more obvious. Sometimes the men will be so tired, they can ‘barely 
pick up their feet,’ and will have to sit and rest for a while, as it is heavy 
work. It can also be difficult to tell who is genuinely fatigued and needs to 
be given lighter work and who is just ‘loafing’. 
The mine overseer suggests that the miners should be medically phased 
out earlier (so that they do not delay the production process) and be taken 
care of properly in a hospital until they pass away, as some of the miners 
have given twenty or so years of loyal service to the company. He feels that 
they deserve better, but realises that it would cost millions and that the mine 
would have difficulty financing such an option.  
This situation puts  him under immense pressure, as he has a less than 
productive team and still has to meet the production targets. He feels that 
management has not been very sympathetic to these problems and  that they 
‘have their heads in the sand,’ about the effect of AIDS on production, 
which are now starting to be felt. He feels he is sitting on a time bomb and 
that it is just a matter of time before management will be forced to take 
more serious notice of the issue, as things are steadily worsening and he 
cannot keep on trying to compensate for the missing workers.  
  Following on from the direct effects of absenteeism and fatigue 
are the negative effects that fatigue and absenteeism have on safety 
procedures in the mine. The overseer is also the leader of the mine’s rescue 
team, in case of fires or accidents underground. The team is made up of 
eight men, but five will usually go out on an ‘incident’ (fire or accident 
underground).  Initial training is one week, but it takes a year’s worth of 




paramedics and firefighting. He is very concerned about the effect of AIDS 
on this team, as a rescuer needs his full strength to perform the job properly. 
A fatigued team member will endanger the lives of his fellows and the other 
miners trapped underground. For example, if there is a fire and the fatigued 
member collapses, he will first have to be put on a stretcher and carried 
above ground by the rest of the team before they can carry on firefighting. 
This costs valuable time and endangers the lives of all concerned. The 
overseer recently had one of his members, whom he suspected was suffering 
from AIDS, ask to be excused from the team. The overseer gladly let him 
go, as he had been worried about this member’s performance for a while.  
Secondly, fatigue and absenteeism affect relationships between 
members of the production team and can be a source of conflict between 
employees when superiors give AIDS sufferers preferential treatment. The 
mine overseer was questioned about the team’s attitude to a member whose 
workload had to be carried by the rest of the team (such as in the case of the 
sick supervisor that he mentioned). How do they treat him if he is always 
sick and do they isolate him if they suspect that he has AIDS? He said that 
they might call him a ‘bosluis’ (parasite) but will compensate for him if he 
is usually a hard worker and a well-liked member of the team. If the sufferer 
is usually a ‘slacker’, the other members of the team will discipline him 
verbally and if no improvement occurs, will ask management to remove him 
from the team. As a general rule team members try to help each other out. 
He was asked if tribal loyalties played a role in this and he said that in the 
past a team leader would gather members of the same tribe around him and 
production teams would consist solely of Zulus, Xhosas, Sothos etc. and that 
this still occurs to some degree today. 
Conflict between employees arises when supervisors do not follow 
the correct labour procedure. This might entail sheltering the sick workers 
who are their favourites, or giving them leave unofficially, while not 
treating workers that they do not like in the same way. Such favouritism is 
apparently leading to labour disputes. Another labour problem that is 
manifesting itself has been labelled ‘the Mix Problem’. This occurs when 
two workers are performing the same function, but Worker One is HIV+ 
and more highly skilled than Worker Two, who is less skilled, and HIV-. 
Worker One will receive the same remuneration that he did in his previous 
position, which is more highly paid than the job he is presently doing. 
Worker Two, who is receiving lower pay for the same job, then feels 
discriminated against. This also leads to ‘promotion problems’ when the 
more highly-skilled employee, who has been in a position for a shorter 
period of time, is promoted ahead of the less skilled employee. 
 





Policy Responses Which Will Mitigate the 
Effect of AIDS on the Firm Studied 
 
Since management has become aware of the severe threat that AIDS poses, 
several changes to policy which will mitigate the effect of AIDS have been 
observed in the firm studied. These policies can be categorised in two ways: 
either as direct and deliberate responses to the AIDS pandemic; or as 
changes that may be a function of (AIDS and) other exogenous factors, but 
which will influence the effect that AIDS has on the company. The first 
category consists of policy responses that have been suggested to firms by 
consultants and experts (see Evian 2000, Whiteside and Sunter, 2000; 
Campbell 2001; HEARD, 2001; Kramer 2001). Foremost amongst them are 
HIV/AIDS education programmes, the supplying of condoms in the mine 
and surrounding community, medical care of a high standard, peer 
counsellors, involvement in the community with youth and women at risk, 
and lastly, changes to labour policy. The second category consists of 
changes to work processes, which will help ‘insure’ the firm against the risk 
of AIDS. It is difficult to ascertain whether these policy changes were 
implemented because of the threat of AIDS or simply to increase 
productivity (although they will indirectly reduce the effect of AIDS) or for 
both these reasons. The second-category policies also include multiskilling 
the workforce, streamlining work processes and upgrading the technology 
used by the colliery in the mining process. This paper will examine the 
policy responses of the mine under study in all these areas. 
 
 
1.  Direct and Deliberate Changes to Policy to 
Mitigate the Effect of AIDS 
These policy changes are aimed primarily at changing the behaviour of or 
providing care and support for HIV/AIDS sufferers who are employees of 
the company or members of the surrounding community. 
 
Education Programmes 
Typical policy responses to the epidemic are attempts to influence the 
employee’s behaviour through education, in order to change the attitudes 
(and therefore the risk behaviour) of employees. This has been the approach 
recommended by consultants and experts (Evian, 2000; Heard 2001). The 
success of such interventions can be measured by so-called ‘Knowledge, 




This was done by management on the mine studied and the 
following questions and statements were answered by the underground 
mining workers (see Table 3 below). 
 
 
Table 3: The KAP Survey Conducted at the Colliery 
Studied 
Question Score 
1 Have you ever heard of HIV/AIDS? 0.9 
2 I could die of HIV/Aids 0.9 
3 I have slept with more than one partner -0.7 
4 Using a condom is the best way to avoid getting 
HIV/AIDS 
0.65 
5 HIV/AIDS will impact my family financially 0.6 
6 Some of my friends are likely to die of HIV/AIDS 0.7 
7 I sweat a lot at night when sleeping -0.8 
8 I know the name of an HIV/AIDS counsellor at 
the shaft 
0.55 
9 I always use condoms when having sex 0.8 
10 Men cannot get HIV/AIDS from other men -0.65 
11 HIV/AIDS is only spread by having sex with a 
HIV person 
-0.75 
12 Can one be dismissed from work for being HIV 
positive? 
-0.7 
13 How will you know your HIV status? 0.8 
14 I sometimes feel very tired during the day -0.8 
15 Can the employer force you to reveal HIV 
status? 
-0.7 
16 Who is at risk of HIV/AIDS? 0.7 
17 Does HIV affect blacks only? -0.8 
18 A person can get HIV/AIDS from condoms -0.9 
 
 
Upon my arrival at the mine, no analysis of the questionnaire had 




answer to each question was weighted with a score between negative one 
and one, for the purposes of analysis. If a ‘yes’ response to a question 
showed that respondents had a good knowledge of HIV/AIDS or that the 
respondent were practising ‘safe’ behaviour in their relationships, then a 
high positive score was allocated - for example, a ‘yes’ response to question  
one yielded a score of 0.9. Responses showing harmful beliefs or practices  
with regard to AIDS were given negative scores. A  ‘yes’ response to 
question eighteen  (showing a belief in incorrect rumours about condoms) 
yielded a score of –0.9.  The scores were then added up and divided by the 
number of respondents in a section, to derive an index for each occupation.  
The results are shown in Figure 5. All occupations achieved 
reasonably high scores, ranging from 7 to 9.64 out of 10 and in no case was 
the result negative for any job group. Surprisingly, the shuttle-car drivers 
achieved the lowest score. Shuttle-car driving is the second highest paid and 
skilled job in the production team. The least skilled job is that performed by 
a worker in the ‘general’ category, yet the score for this occupational group 
is marginally better that those for the shuttle-car drivers. This indicates that 
safer behaviour does not seem to increase with an increase in level of skill 


























































































The artisans and leaders underground (team leaders or ‘mpasopi’ 
and shift bosses), who were electricians, engineers or who had some other 
tertiary education, achieved the highest scores. These workers are often 
highly skilled and are in the monthly salaried personnel salary bracket 
(MSP). On the whole though, there were not great differences between the 
scores of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled employees. 
It appears that all respondents have a good knowledge of AIDS and 
how it can be transmitted. From the scores on behaviour however, it can be 
seen that respondents are not necessarily acting in accordance with their 
knowledge of safe behaviour practices. For example, condom usage will be 
low, despite the respondent knowing that a condom will protect him from 
AIDS. 
This raises the questions as to why respondents are not altering 
their behaviour, and following on from that, what management can do to 
influence behaviour in an attempt to stop the spread of the epidemic. The 
gap between understanding and practice, and the failure of education 
programmes to change behaviour, are well-documented (Campbell 1997 and 
2001; Plimmer, 1995). Campbell (1997 and 2001) mentions several factors 
that may compromise condom usage, even when the person concerned is 
well educated about AIDS.  Campbell argues that these factors include 
poverty, cultural identities about the role of men in society, the few 
recreational opportunities besides sex and drinking that are available on the 
mines and a need for intimacy, as most men are migrant workers who are 
away from their wives and families. Campbell quotes Mechanic (1990:280): 
‘In the final instance HIV is a social problem insofar as those with the 
poorest health experiences the world over are generally those who come 
from the most disrupted social settings and are the least constrained or 
protected by family and community expectations.’ 
Plimmer (1995) in Williams (1995) believes that the fault lies with 
the education programmes and argues ‘They (education programmes) have 
tended to be Eurocentric and information-based, not skills-based. They 
don’t take account of people’s different cultures, values, literacy levels and 
so on…Education programmes need to address the lifestyles of the 
mineworkers,’  
It is possible that different cultural beliefs between educators and 
their audience play a vital role on the mine investigated. It is a factor that 
has been unrecognised and underestimated in AIDS education to date, 
although Campbell (1997) has mentioned it. Many of the mineworkers are 
recruited from rural areas and have little education. The strong role of 
culture, tradition and superstition in their belief systems cannot be 




were so similar for both the general workers and shuttle-car drivers. The 
only difference between the two categories is that shuttle-car drivers have 
received more training, or have worked for the mine for a longer period of 
time and have ‘worked themselves up’ into the position. Workers in both 
categories may have been recruited from the same rural area, with the same 
cultures and traditions  probably playing a central role in their belief 
systems. Also, both are likely to be hostel or township dwellers. All these 
factors could give them the same risk profile if culture and tradition play an 
important role in determining behaviour. 
The mine doctor mentioned in an interview that some of his 
patients believed that AIDS can be contracted through condom lubricants 
and healed by witch doctors. A mine overseer mentioned that one of his 
supervisors from Lesotho, whom he suspects is HIV+, believes that 
somebody who is jealous of his job is poisoning him and his family. These 
all point to the fact that superstition and culture are playing a role in 
workers’ paradigms and this should be taken into account in AIDS 
education.  
Education programmes may also lack credibility with their hearers 
because of possible distrust of the communicators of the information 
(management), especially considering South Africa’s history of racism and 
apartheid - there is not a high level of trust between miners and 
management. In light of this, any information given by  the latter may be 
viewed with some suspicion. On the mine studied, the mine manager 
himself went underground to encourage production teams to use condoms. 
This could have been the least constructive approach to take, given that the 
mine manager may be perceived as the head of a management structure that 
is deliberately trying to disseminate damaging information; the mine doctor 
and an overseer had both heard rumours that AIDS is a disease spread by 
white men from the ‘previous regime’. The mine has now implemented a  
‘peer counselling’ system, where employees are trained to disseminate 
AIDS information amongst their peers and be available for confidential 
counselling. This was implemented with success at Carletonville Gold Mine 
(see Campbell, 2001), and it is hoped that this will give AIDS education 
more credibility and make it more widespread.   
It is the opinion of one of the mine nurses that workers do not 
behave responsibly, as there is a strong attitude of denial about the 
possibility of being affected by the disease. There is a feeling amongst 
employees that AIDS is something that happens to other people. In the KAP 
survey conducted, between half and a third of respondents thought it 
unlikely that some of their friends would die of AIDS, which could indicate 
denial that they and their friends could be affected by the disease.  




disease. ‘Although many mine workers know about HIV and AIDS, few 
believe in the seriousness of the disease. They have never seen anyone die 
of AIDS…The impact that HIV will have has not yet hit home and this is 
the crux of the problem. If the perception of mineworkers is that HIV exists 
but that they have never seen its effects, they cannot be expected to take it 
seriously and do something about altering their lifestyles,’ (Plimmer, 
1995:59 in Williams, 1995).  
The mine overseer agrees that his employees attribute most deaths 
to tuberculosis only, for example, as opposed to AIDS-related tuberculosis. 
Until workers see the effects of AIDS, education programmes are not likely 
to result in a change in behaviour, and the AIDS epidemic will not be halted. 
 
AIDS Prevention in the Community 
The common consensus amongst mining houses and experts (Wilson in 
Campbell, 1995; Anglo American, 2000; Powerbelt, 2000; Evian, 2000; 
HEARD, 2001; and Steinberg and Smith, quoted in Financial Mail 2001) is 
that the fight against AIDS must be enacted in the communities where the 
mines are based. This especially includes AIDS education, peer counselling, 
and job creation amongst women at risk. Shebeens and other places of 
recreation, which have grown up rapidly during the past ten years in the 
townships surrounding the mines, are now being targeted by AIDS 
education programmes. Women are also proving to be more approachable 
and willing to listen to the HIV/AIDS prevention message than the miners. 
Statistics obtained from the AIDS Director (from a study done at Kriel 
colliery) showed estimates that if 500 men were educated, 88 HIV infections 
would be prevented. However, this figure rises to 10200 cases if the same 
number of sex workers can be reached. Focusing on commercial sex 
workers is estimated to be 40 to 200 times more effective in reducing 
HIV/AIDS than comparable programmes for the wider population.  
In an attempt to deal with these concerns, the major collieries in 
Mpumalanga have joined forces with their associated industry partners and 
labour organisations to establish a campaign called ‘The Powerbelt 
HIV/AIDS Project’, which has the support of the South African Collieries 
Management Association. This is a long-term solution and it could be 
argued that the firm would benefit only indirectly;  there is also no 
guarantee that this type of intervention will be successful at all.  
 
 
2.  Policy Changes that Will Indirectly Mitigate 
the Effect of AIDS on the Firm 




implementing are those in work processes (such as multiskilling and 
training) or work policy changes which effect productivity. The latter may 
be a deliberate response to AIDS or be implemented due to an exogenous 
factor (which would have occurred in the absence of AIDS anyway) but 
which will in any case decrease the impact of AIDS. 
  
Multiskilling the Workforce and Training Replacement Workers 
As mentioned above, production teams have had to become more 
multiskilled as a response to the epidemic. Multiskilling is an option being 
considered by the mine, and the mining technical officer explained its 
advantages to me: twelve men make up a ‘section’ or production team. To 
prevent any loss in productivity in the short term, at least eight men are 
needed to perform the core functions otherwise drilling cannot occur at all. 
This is under a ‘worst case scenario’, as the team then has to manage 
without the cable handler for the continuous miner, which is difficult and 
will slow down the mining process, decreasing productivity. Preferably nine 
men should perform the core functions under a ‘normal scenario’. This 
leaves three men remaining, of whom two are usually absent due to training 
or being on leave. This means that only one person (two under the ‘worst 
case scenario’) can fall ill.  A summary is given in the table below: 
 
 
Table 4: Illustration of the Number of Men that can be 






Complete Production Team 12 12 
Minimum Requirement of Men -9 -8 
"Spare" Team Members 3 4 
Members on leave/ training -2 -2 





The mine is still negotiating with the unions about the wages to be 
paid if the entire team is multiskilled. This is necessary because then nine 
men would move up into the highest wage bracket on the team, that of 




salaries now. You have to do a calculation to see if the higher salaries now 
are worth the losses that you might incur. They [management] know that 
AIDS is going to make an impact, but they don’t know how hard it will be,’ 
says the technical officer. Multiskilling also results in higher training costs 
for the company. Yet these costs may provide a cheaper form of ‘insurance’ 
for management, given the fact that AIDS can strike randomly across 
different skill levels, than the loss of productivity due to absenteeism. 
 
Streamlining Work Processes 
As part of a productivity improvement programme that has been 
implemented across the entire firm, mining procedures were streamlined and 
made more cost-effective. The technical officer devised a method whereby 
time at the coalface was saved through greater efficiency, which almost 
doubled production. This would certainly reduce the effect of AIDS on the 
productivity of the firm. 
 
The Role of Technology  
Technology has played a vital role in increasing the productivity and 
profitability of coal mining (Lang 1995). Anecdotal evidence heard on the 
mine,  reportedly from mining engineers, points towards all machinery 
being operated by remote control, via computer and video screens on the 
mine surface, in ten years time. Very little underground labour will be 
employed, with the exception of maintenance staff. ‘Automation will enable 
two to three operators to control and monitor an entire production fleet of 
LHD (load-haul-dumper) machines and dump-trucks whereas, in the past, it 
was a case of one operator to a machine…Once the machines have been 
assigned to carry out predetermined activities, the area will be isolated, 
meaning that mine personnel will be withdrawn from the working area.’ 
(‘Age of driverless mining machines in sight’,  Mining Weekly, 29/6/ 2001).  
With this kind of innovation, management may decide that 
reducing their underground labour force, which is perceived to be more 
likely to contract AIDS, and replacing it with machinery, is the best way of 
reducing the firm’s exposure to risk. Since this technology is being 
developed overseas, mines would not have to develop it themselves. This 
would make the implementation of such a decision easier, as would the 
attrition of the labour force due to AIDS. Fewer workers underground would 
also mean a decrease in the cost of safety procedures and compensation to 
workers injured in accidents. Money would  also be saved because the 
machines work 23 hours a day, stopping for only one hour in 24 for 
refuelling and maintenance. 




with technology is crucial to understanding how the firm is responding to 
AIDS. Mechanisation may be perceived as a cheaper option to that of  
paying higher salaries to a multiskilled workforce, who can still fall ill. This 
may reduce the risk and cost of AIDS to the firm on one level, but raises it 
on another: if only three operators are controlling the entire fleet of LHD 
machines, the loss of a surface operator to AIDS will now result in several 
LHDs unable to function. Training costs and salaries of these operators will 
also be higher than a present operator’s salary. This may be offset by the 
fact that these higher-skilled, -paid and -educated operators are less likely to 
get AIDS, or if they do, the physical demands of the job are not so 
strenuous, enabling an employee to be productive for longer. If the 
proportion of labour costs falls as a result of mechanisation, then this risk 
may not be so serious.  
 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
This paper has examined various methods of assessing the costs  of AIDS in 
the mining industry. Firstly, the methodology and weaknesses of these 
methods was discussed, as was their application to the firm examined. A 
case study was then conducted within a particular colliery, examining it for 
areas where AIDS-induced costs were most likely to be observed, as found 
by Aventin and Huard (2000). Further categories not examined by Aventin 
and Huard (2000) were studied, in order to get an estimation of the impact 
of AIDS over time. Evidence ‘from the coal face’ was given in order to 
provide more insight into the situation on the mine, where it might not show 
up in the quantitative data. Lastly, responses of the firm to the epidemic and 
their effectiveness were examined. 
I believe that AIDS is only just beginning to have a tangible effect 
on the firm, and that this is being felt primarily amongst the underground 
mining workers. This is causing tension to develop between the 
underground managers and upper levels of management, who are perceived 
as failing to appreciate the effects on productivity that AIDS is starting to 
cause underground. Future research still needs to be done on estimating 
indirect costs that are difficult to quantify, as this is the area where most 
current predictive models are floundering. The perception that technology is 
cheaper than labour needs to be investigated further, as do the costs 
associated with this change. This will give valuable insight into the response 
of firms to the threats posed by AIDS in an industry that is a large-scale 
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